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CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ENCOURAGING BAD BEHAVIOR: FROM 
CHEERING AT A GANG RAPE TO PROMOTING OPIOID ABUSE
James A. Henderson, Jr.*
This Article examines the civil liability of actors who encourage 
others to behave badly, thereby causing harm. The analysis distinguishes 
between individual encouragers and business-entity encouragers. 
Individuals most often intend for the bad behaviors and the consequential 
harms to occur—witness cheerleaders at a gang rape. This Article 
advocates stern treatment of such mean-spirited malcontents. On the one 
hand, if their encouragement is a but-for condition of the others’ harm 
causing bad behavior, they should be subject to liability based on 
traditional intentional tort. On the other hand, if their encouragement is 
not a but-for condition, this essay proposes an exception to the no duty-
to-rescue rule that exposes such encouragers to liability. Regarding
business entities charged with encouraging bad behavior—witness 
pharmaceutical companies that allegedly encourage opioid abuse—this 
essay argues against expanding existing exposures to liability. 
Commercial distributors of goods and services typically do not intend for 
the bad behaviors or the harms to occur; thus plaintiffs typically charge 
them with negligent marketing rather than intentional tort. A major 
reason for caution in regard to business entities is the invariable tendency 
of plaintiffs’ lawyers to expand new theories of tort, such as negligent 
marketing, into systems of strict enterprise liability. While arguably 
defensible in theory, in actual practice court-made enterprise liability is 
unmanageable, inefficient, and unfair. Thus, even as this essay advocates 
expanding the liabilities of individuals who encourage bad behavior in 
nonbusiness settings, it argues against doing so with respect to 
commercial entities who distribute and promote goods and services. The 
former, with few exceptions, deserve to be held civilly liable. The latter, 
in most instances, do not.
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INTRODUCTION
Would Desdemona’s parents have a cause of action against Iago for 
manipulating Othello into murdering their daughter?1 The following 
analysis answers this and a number of related questions that arise when 
actors encourage others to behave badly, causing harm. Othello’s 
conduct—killing his wife—was clearly criminal. In all of the examples 
considered in this Article in which an individual tort defendant 
encourages another—the perpetrator—to harm third-person victims, the 
                                                                                                                     
* Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1959, 
Princeton University; LL.B. 1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard University. The author thanks his 
daughter, Kate Helber, for her insights.
1. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF 
VENICE. In this well-known literary example of encouraging bad behavior, Othello, a military 
general, passes over a subordinate, Iago, for a promotion. Seeking revenge, Iago pretends to be 
Othello’s friend while gradually convincing Othello that his wife is unfaithful and deserves to die 
by his hand. Thus, Iago is the quintessential encourager of bad behavior.
2
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same thing is true: The perpetrator’s conduct in deliberately causing harm 
is criminal in nature. The encourager’s actions may also be criminal, but 
this analysis does not pursue that possibility. By contrast, in many cases 
in which an actor encourages someone who is also the victim, as would 
be the case if Iago had persuaded Desdemona to take her own life, the 
victim’s self-destructive behavior would not constitute a crime and yet 
the encourager might nevertheless be criminally, as well as civilly, 
liable.2 So the bad behaviors upon which this Article focuses include, but 
are not limited to, criminal conduct. The harm of which this Article 
speaks includes physical and emotional harm; it does not include 
commercial or purely economic loss. For this reason, actions for 
interference with contractual relations are excluded from the analysis.
Harmful behavior that is immoral or abjectly wasteful presents the 
possibility that those who encourage such bad behavior will be civilly 
liable to those harmed by it. When may a tort defendant be said to have 
encouraged bad behavior? For purpose of this analysis, encouragement 
occurs whenever an actor communicates with another intending to 
influence the other to behave badly. The actor may also supply the other 
with the physical, informational, or psychological means necessary to 
engage in bad behavior, thereby becoming an enabler as well as an 
encourager.3 This Article argues that influential communications, either 
verbal or nonverbal, should suffice to support civil liability when they 
encourage bad behavior that harms either the addressee or a third-party 
victim, even if those communications are not but-for causes of the harm.
Enablement makes an even stronger case for liability, but encouragement
by itself should suffice. Moreover, if liability is otherwise appropriate, 
the actor who encourages a particular type of bad behavior should be 
liable for the proximate harms that follow, even if the exact harm 
experienced was not the harm intended by the actor. Thus, if Othello 
merely injured Desdemona in a bungled attempt to kill her, Iago should 
be civilly liable for her injuries.
It is important to distinguish between individual actors who encourage 
bad behavior and business entities accused of doing likewise. Thus, Part 
I considers the liability of individual actors and Part II considers the 
liability of business entities. Under each of these general categories, it 
                                                                                                                     
2. Regarding the victim’s self-destructive conduct, see Donald W. Grieshober, Suicide—
Criminal Aspects, 1 VILL. L. REV. 316, 317 (1956), which explains that a majority of states hold 
that suicide is not a crime. Regarding the encouragers’ criminal responsibility, see infra note 65.
3. In this analysis an enabler is an actor who gives a perpetrator the means to do something.
An enabler may not be a but-for cause of a victim’s harm if the perpetrator fails to use the means 
to cause the harm. But if the perpetrator does use the means, the enabler will be a but-for cause of 
the victim’s harm. In any event, a defendant’s status as an enabler opens up the possibility that an 
actor may be liable for negligently inducing bad behavior—negligent marketing—even in the 
absence of actual intent to cause such behavior to occur. See generally infra notes 86–102 and 
accompanying text (discussing the claim of negligent marketing).
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will be helpful to employ specific hypothetical examples to sharpen the 
analysis. In the first section of Part I, the primary illustrative example of 
actors encouraging others to harm third-party victims involves a gang 
rape in a tavern. The analysis of this example focuses on the liability of 
the individuals who encourage the rapists but do not physically 
participate in, or otherwise actually cause, the rape. The primary example 
in the second section of Part I considers an actor encouraging a victim to 
harm himself. It involves a young woman who, in the course of rejecting 
a boyfriend’s overtures, persuades him to commit suicide. One approach 
to these illustrative examples would be to consider the defendant actors 
to have breached duties to rescue the victims from their undesirable fates. 
When encouragement actually causes harmful bad behavior, plaintiffs do 
not need rescue theory. But when the encouragement falls short of 
actually causing the harmful behavior, failure to rescue may be the only 
cause of action available to the victims.4 This Article considers the 
possibility of such rescue-based remedies. 
Part II shifts the focus from individual actors to business entities. 
Here, companies distribute—and encourage the use and consumption 
of—goods and services that end up harming people. Thus, the companies’ 
distributional activities, accompanied by product promotions, are but-for 
causes of the harms suffered. Of course, promoting their products is what 
companies are supposed to do. So something more is required for 
liability. Part II explores what this something else might be. The 
examples in Part II mostly involve pharmaceutical companies that 
allegedly encourage dangerous misuses of their prescription drugs. The 
leading illustrative example centers on the current opioid crisis. It 
involves drug companies that, by supplying abnormally large quantities 
of addictive, non-defective pain killers to certain distributors, have 
allegedly encouraged pill mills to engage in the illegal and harmful 
distribution of the company’s products to opioid addicts. If a plaintiff 
cannot prove that the defendant intended to cause the opioid abuse, 
enablement in the form of negligent marketing may provide a basis for 
liability. Other illustrative examples in Part II involve pharmaceutical 
companies that either bribe physicians to overprescribe their products or 
encourage overconsumption of their products by promoting them through 
seductive, direct-to-consumer advertising.
In connection with each hypothetical example, the analysis suggests
the appropriate outcome and the conceptual/doctrinal paths by which 
                                                                                                                     
4. Tort actions based on misfeasance—intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability—
all require plaintiffs to prove but-for, actual causation. See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR.
ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS ch. 2 (9th ed. 2017) (explaining but-for causation). Failure to rescue 
is the only basis of liability that allows recovery for nonfeasance in the absence of but-for actual 
causation, in the sense that the would-be rescuer did not cause the initial situation that harmed the 
victim.
4
Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss1/3
2019] CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ENCOURAGING BAD BEHAVIOR 127
courts might reach that outcome. Rather than rehashing the normative 
positions supporting both the paths and the outcomes, this essay identifies 
the normative implications of choosing among alternative positions and 
makes explicit assumptions regarding which position is preferable. Thus, 
the analysis is mainly positive—it assumes normative positions and 
focuses mainly on legal doctrines and conceptual structures. Readers who 
agree with the author’s underlying normative assumptions may find the 
analysis persuasive. Conversely, those who disagree with the normative 
premises may for that reason reject one or more of the suggested 
approaches. In either event, the author trusts readers will find the analysis 
enlightening and provocative.
I. LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL ACTORS WHO ENCOURAGE
BAD BEHAVIOR
As noted, individual actors present a different set of issues than do 
business entities. Courts are justified in expanding individuals’ exposures 
to liability, while quite the opposite is true with regard to businesses
accused of encouraging bad behavior in the context of distributing goods 
and services.
A. Encouraging Others to Harm Third-Person Victims
1. The First Hypothetical Example: Cheering at a Gang Rape
The actual event that inspires this first hypothetical example involved 
a gang rape in a tavern in New Bedford, Massachusetts. The episode 
generated a firestorm of public reaction5 and inspired a well-received 
movie starring Jodie Foster as the victim and subsequent complainant in 
a criminal trial.6 In the hypothetical version considered here, which also 
occurs in a tavern, three men begin to rape a young woman in the presence 
of at least thirty other patrons, all of whom are strangers to the victim. 
Some of these patrons flee and never contact the police. Others remain in 
the tavern. None of the onlookers, including tavern employees, intervene 
or attempt to use their cell phones to notify the police. Indeed, a handful 
of the patron-onlookers cheer the rapists. The question is whether anyone 
besides the rapists should be civilly liable to the victim. Central to this 
Article’s analysis is whether the cheerleaders should be liable for having 
encouraged, without having actually caused, the rapists’ brutal attack.7
                                                                                                                     
5. For an account of the incident and the media reactions, see Steven J. Heyman, 
Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 678 n.17 (1994).
6. See THE ACCUSED (Paramount Pictures 1988).
7. Cheering the perpetrators constituted encouragement, but this analysis assumes that the 
rape would have occurred even in the absence of the cheering. Of course, it is possible that the 
cheering added marginally to the intensity or duration of the rapists’ attack or may have helped to 
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Certainly the victim should reach the trier of fact with claims against 
the tavern’s operators for their failure, through their employees, to take 
reasonable steps to protect a business invitee.8 Equally clearly, the victim 
should not reach the jury with failure-to-rescue claims against the patrons 
who fled the scene or remained as passive bystanders. Under the common 
law of torts, individuals owe no general duty to rescue strangers9 in the 
absence of a preexisting special relationship with the victim,10 an 
observed causal connection between the defendants’ prior conduct 
(whether or not negligent) and the victim’s plight,11 or an abandoned 
attempt by defendants to intervene that leads other would-be rescuers to 
rest on their oars.12 Although some commentators have urged recognition 
of a general legal duty to engage in low-cost rescue,13 which some of the 
tavern patrons might have accomplished with their cell phones, this 
author has elsewhere disagreed with these broad pro-rescue proposals.14
                                                                                                                     
cause onlookers to refrain from rescue. But that would be very difficult to determine and is 
assumed not to be the case in this hypothetical.
8. For pro-plaintiff treatments of a general duty to take reasonable steps to protect business 
invitees, see generally David A. Roodman, Business Owners Duty to Protect Invitees from Third 
Party Criminal Attacks-or-“Business Owners Beware: Missouri Ups the Ante,” 54 MO. L. REV.
443 (1989), which reviews recognized theories of liability that impose a duty upon businesses to 
protect invitees, and Michael J. Yelnosky, Business Inviters’ Duty to Protect Invitees from 
Criminal Acts, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 883 (1986), which argues that courts should impose a duty 
upon businesses to protect invitees. For a discussion of the rule imposing a duty on business 
entities to rescue invitees on businesses premises open to the public, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 cmt. d.
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 cmts.
a, b. See generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 4 (stating that there is an absence of a general 
duty to rescue).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 40–41. 
See generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 266 (explaining that the most typical exception 
to the no-duty-to-rescue rule is a preexisting special relationship).
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 39. See
generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 270–71 (explaining this creation of the peril rule).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 44(b). See
generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 266–69 (explaining this abandonment rule).
13. The classic argument is presented by James Barr Ames. James Barr Ames, Law and 
Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 111–13 (1908) (arguing that tort liability should be imposed on 
those who, with “little or no inconvenience,” could have effected a rescue but did not); see also
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 251 (1980) (arguing that a 
duty of easy rescue would strengthen common law principles); Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical 
Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 25–26 (1993) (stating that requiring easy rescue is justifiable under liberty and privacy 
principles when a rescuer can bring about a significant social benefit at trivial cost to himself). 
14. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 200–01
(1973); James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 928–43
(1982); Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in 
American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1466 (2008).
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From this limited-rescue perspective, even if one assumes (as does this 
author for purposes of analysis) the existence of an underlying moral duty
to make reasonable efforts to rescue strangers,15 a legal duty to the same 
effect would present problems of rule-application both in the field and in 
court that, on grounds of fairness, support the traditional no-legal-duty 
rule.16
Now comes the hard part. What about the cheerleaders? Putting rescue 
aside for a moment, the rape victim will not make out intentional tort 
claims because she will not be able to show that the cheerleading caused 
her to suffer harmful contact or emotional upset.17 (It will be noted that a 
successful failure-to-rescue claim would overcome the plaintiff’s 
problem with causation.)18 Nor will the victim, in the absence of but-for 
causation, be able to make out a negligence claim against the 
cheerleaders, other than a claim based on failure-to-rescue.19 So it comes 
down to this: Can the plaintiff on these facts make out a rescue-based 
claim? None of the recognized exceptions to the traditional no-duty rule 
are available: no preexisting special relationship existed between the 
cheerleaders and the victim such that the victim would have a reasonable 
expectation of rescue;20 none of the cheerleaders began to effect rescue 
and then abandoned the attempt, causing would-be rescuers to rest on 
their oars;21 and none of the cheerleaders contributed, before the fact, to 
causing the victim’s plight.22
Again, a minority of commentators urge  courts to recognize a general 
legal duty to engage in low-cost rescue and thus would expose all of the 
tavern patrons, including the cheerleaders, to potential liability on that 
                                                                                                                     
15. See Weinrib, supra note 13. One author has observed that Professor Weinrib 
subsequently adjusted his position in this regard. See Heyman, supra note 5, at 676 n.13. Professor 
Weinrib’s article nevertheless remains a guidepost. In Henderson, supra note 14, at 942–43, this 
author accepts the premise of a moral duty to rescue.
16. See Henderson, supra note 14, at 943 (“Courts have refused to impose a general [legal] 
duty to rescue largely because it would be unmanageable as a guide to either primary or 
adjudicative behavior.”).
17. See supra notes 4, 7 and accompanying text. Regarding the tort of intentional, 
outrageous infliction of severe emotional distress, but-for causation is necessary. See generally
HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at ch. 11 (explaining the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress). The reasonable factual assumption here is that, under the circumstances, the rape 
victim's suffering was not made worse by the handful of cheerleaders.
18. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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ground.23 This author, while accepting the premise of an underlying 
moral duty, opposes a general legal duty because of problems of 
unfairness associated with the application of such a legal rule.24 These 
problems relate to the necessity, under what may be described as process 
norms, that legal rules conform to articulable criteria in order to fairly 
guide the conduct of actors both ex ante in the field and ex post in the 
courtroom.25 Thus, for a legal rule to affect behavior in the manner 
intended, it must be comprehensible to its addressees;26 must refer to 
factual circumstances that actors both in the field and later in court are 
able to verify;27 must set a standard for conduct to which its addressees 
are capable of conforming;28 and must generate disputes that are fairly 
manageable in court.29 In an earlier article developing these process 
norms, this author explains at length how a general rule requiring low-
cost rescue would, in most instances, violate all of them.30 Tort law 
admonitions not to cause harm provide built-in limitations that render 
their applications on the whole both manageable and fair.31 By contrast, 
admonitions to prevent harm from befalling strangers, even with the 
reference to “low cost,” are unavoidably open-ended, ambiguous, and 
vaguely aspirational.32 For example, some of the tavern patrons who sat 
silently and watched the rape—especially those who were somewhat 
intoxicated—may have been confused over what was happening;33 may 
                                                                                                                     
23. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. If one assumes that all the patrons possessed 
or had access to cell phones, a plausible case can be made that all the patrons could have affected 
low-cost rescue by calling the police.
24. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
25. See Henderson, supra note 14, at 904–11.
26. Id. at 911–13.
27. Id. at 913–14.
28. Id. at 914–15.
29. Id. at 916.
30. Id. at 930–40.
31. The legal standards for intentional torts and strict liability are quite specific in their 
descriptions of the harmful conduct that triggers liability. The reasonable person standard for 
negligence is more open-ended and thus problematic. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., 
Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976)
(discussing the limits of adjudication and the expansion of the negligence concept). What reduces 
the unmanageability of the negligence standard is the requirement that the plaintiff prove with 
specificity what the defendant should have done differently to reduce or avoid the plaintiff’s harm. 
See generally Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Fixing Failure to Warn, 90 IND. L.J.
237 (2015) (discussing the issues with the failure to warn doctrine).
32. See Henderson, supra note 14, at 936–38 (“[N]ot only would the number of defendants 
tend to complicate failure-to-rescue cases [under a general duty], but the interrelationships among 
the defendants . . . would present potentially high levels of [unmanageability].”).
33. Further variables such as defendant’s age, distance of defendant from where in the 
tavern the rape occurred, and the level of lighting would render a general rescue rule difficult to 
apply fairly and consistently.
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reasonably have assumed that the tavern management would intervene;34
may have been uncertain regarding whom, or how, to call for help;35 or 
may have been so psychologically traumatized as to be incapable of 
responding.36 To hold defendants to the traditional objective standard of 
due care—in effect ignoring personal limitations that rendered rescue for 
some defendants difficult or impossible—would be grossly unfair.37 And 
yet, to apply a subjective standard that allows for personal mental and 
psychological idiosyncrasies would render issues under a general duty to 
rescue incomprehensible, non-verifiable, and unmanageable.38
Thus, a general legal duty to undertake low-cost rescue casts a liability 
net that is both excessively wide and administratively problematic. A 
narrower rule that limits liability to encouragers of bad behavior largely 
avoids such difficulties. By shouting encouragement, the cheerleaders 
unwittingly identified themselves as potential tort defendants whose civil 
prosecution would not only be morally justified but would also avoid 
most of the difficulties described above. Clearly the cheerleaders 
understood what was happening, even if some of the other patrons in the 
tavern did not. Equally clearly, the cheerleaders’ expressed approval of 
the gang rape should prevent them from plausibly claiming to have been 
psychologically paralyzed by disgust or fear.39 By refusing to contact the 
police, the cheerleaders breached a moral duty to rescue the victim even 
if their deplorable conduct did not actually cause the victim to suffer 
harm.40 From that perspective, all of the tavern patrons who could easily 
have called for help breached a moral duty to the victim.41 Under a formal 
                                                                                                                     
34. Cf. supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing potential claims against the 
operators of the tavern).
35. Young adults—typical law students, for example—probably can’t imagine that this 
might be a problem. They will have to believe the author that for some of us it certainly might be.
36. To this possibility may be the added fear that the rapists, observing that rescue attempts 
were under way, might turn their anger on the rescuers.
37. For a discussion of the objective standard, see generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 
4, at ch. 3. Certainly, courts do not adjust the standard to reflect individuals’ mental incapacities. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(c) (AM.
LAW. INST. 2010). For a discussion of the potential unfairness, under the conformability norm, of 
applying an objective standard in the context of failure to rescue, see Henderson, supra note 14,
at 930–32.
38. See Henderson, supra note 14, at 932.
39. Paralysis suggests an inability to act. The cheerleaders not only acted but also could not 
rationally argue that a combination of disgust and fear prevented them from attempting low-cost 
rescue. Having volunteered to intervene, the marginal costs of being helpful rather than hurtful 
were presumably lower than they were for non-intervenors. Cf. supra note 36 and accompanying 
text (excusing those who are psychologically disturbed to the point of being incapable of 
responding).
40. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
9
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process of rule-application that is manageable and fair, however, only 
those patrons who unambiguously and openly expressed approval could 
be held legally liable.42
It follows that under the analysis in this Article, the gang rape victim 
should have a cause of action against the cheerleaders for failing to rescue 
her,43 assuming triers of fact could find that an attempted rescue would 
have been successful. This should be true even if such a cause would not 
be available against the tavern patrons who fled the scene or remained 
and watched silently.44 Upon reflection, the three recognized exceptions 
to the no-duty-to-rescue rule all serve to identify defendants for whom 
imposing liability does not present problems of unfairness.45 In effect, 
this analysis argues that a fourth exception should be added to the first 
three: An individual owes a legal duty to act reasonably to rescue another 
from a threat of harm whenever the individual encourages the other or a 
third person to cause the threatened harm, thereby demonstrating that the 
individual appreciates the surrounding factual circumstances and is 
capable of performing the rescue that the facts warrant. Legal liability 
will follow upon a plaintiff’s showing that an attempted rescue would 
have succeeded.46 Those who advocate a legal duty to engage in low-cost 
rescue would presumably agree with the result suggested here regarding 
the cheerleaders47 but would extend the duty to all the tavern patrons who 
had access to the physical means to call the police but did not.48 The 
analysis in this Article treats the cheerleaders as a special case.
                                                                                                                     
42. Again, none of the difficulties of formally applying a general legal duty to rescue, see
supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text, would be impediments to fair procedural application 
of such a legal duty to the cheerleaders. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. It will be 
observed that no concomitant procedural difficulties accompany the informal application of moral 
standards.
43. Although for a legal duty to rescue to arise the defendant need not create the risk from 
which the victim needs to be rescued, see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 7, scope note (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (stating that there are 
exceptions to the general no-duty-to-rescue rule for people who did not create the risk), to make 
out a claim for breach of the duty the victim must show that the omitted rescue attempt would 
have succeeded.
44. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
45. For descriptions of the recognized exceptions, see supra notes 10–12 and accompanying
text. For descriptions of the problems of rule-application, see supra notes 26–29 and 
accompanying text. Taking as an example the recognized exception based on abandoning a rescue 
attempt part way through, such a liability rule would be no less comprehensible than the general 
negligence standard, cf. supra note 31 (explaining that a negligence standard is both fair and 
manageable); would present verifiable issues of fact regarding what actually happened; would 
describe an obligation—don’t quit part way—to which its addressees are presumably capable of 
conforming; and would be sufficiently specific to be manageable in court.
46. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
47. A general duty would logically subsume all arguably special cases within it.
48. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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2.  A Second Example: Iago’s Treachery
Another example of an individual actor encouraging another to 
behave badly is the one alluded to in the Introduction: Iago’s 
psychological manipulation of Othello to murder Desdemona.49 Given 
the manner in which Shakespeare structures the tragedy, it is likely that 
Othello would not have killed his wife but for Iago’s machinations. To 
be sure, Othello’s personality made him prone in any event to suspecting
his wife of infidelity,50 and the events that finally triggered his rage were 
in important part a combination of other actors’ spite and random 
chance.51 This analysis begins by assuming, as the Bard probably 
intended, that Iago’s behavior was a necessary condition for Othello’s 
deadly act. Thus, Iago not only encouraged Othello, he also 
psychologically enabled him by providing the mindset necessary for 
Othello to commit murder. An actor can enable a perpetrator in three 
different but related ways: physically, as would be the case if Iago had 
held Desdemona while Othello smothered her to death;52 informationally,
as would be the case if Iago had instructed Othello on how to kill his wife 
without being apprehended;53 and psychologically, as was the case when 
Iago convinced Othello, not otherwise inclined to harm Desdemona, that 
Desdemona deserved to die at his hand.54 In all of these hypothetical 
instances of successful enablement, Iago would be exposed to liability for 
committing an intentional tort, most likely a battery. Iago acted intending 
to induce Othello to cause a harmful contact with Desdemona’s person 
and such a harmful contact resulted from Iago’s actions.55 And § 5 of the 
Restatement, Third, of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
                                                                                                                     
49. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
50. Othello seems to jump quickly to the conclusion that Desdemona has been unfaithful 
with a recently-demoted soldier, Cassio, when she asks Othello to reinstate Cassio to his previous 
rank. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, act 2, sc. 3.
51. Thus, Iago’s wife, Emilia, happens to find and possess one of Desdemona’s 
handkerchiefs, which she gives to Iago who plants it in Cassio’s room where Othello will find it.
Id. act 3, sc. 4.
52. In similar fashion, the cheerleaders in the gang rape hypothetical might have helped 
hold down the victim.
53. In similar fashion, one or more of the cheerleaders in the earlier example might have 
instructed the criminal perpetrators on how best to accomplish the rape.
54. The encouragement in the gang rape example might have begun some time before the 
rape, during which time the cheerleaders talked the rapists into committing the crime. These 
different modes of enablement parallel the three characteristics of an effective risk minimizer:
information regarding the risk, the capacity to act on the information, and adequate motivation.
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Optional Safety Devices: Delegating Product 
Design Responsibility to the Market, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1399, 1403, 1405 (2013). When an actor 
lacks one (or more) of these characteristics, the enabler steps in and supplies the missing element.
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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Harms—the so-called “umbrella intentional tort”56—would also support 
liability.57 The tort of intentional infliction of mental distress might be 
available to Desdemona’s representatives against Iago on her behalf.58
Indeed, Othello’s representatives might also have such a claim.59
Should Iago be civilly liable for failing to rescue Desdemona? Of 
course, Iago’s status as an enabler renders this issue moot.60 But what if 
Iago’s encouragement had not caused the murder to occur? What if 
Othello was already committed to killing his wife and would have done
so on his own initiative in the absence of Iago’s treachery? In that 
scenario, even assuming that courts do not recognize a general duty to 
rescue, several rescue-based avenues—exceptions to the no-duty rule—
might be available to Desdemona’s representatives. For one, Iago may 
have been in a sufficient preexisting relationship with Desdemona to 
support her reasonable expectation that Iago would protect her by 
dissuading Othello from his deadly plan or warning her or her parents.61
On the reasonable assumption that a relationship sufficient to support a 
duty to rescue did not exist, and assuming the other two recognized 
exceptions do not apply,62 should the proposed fourth exception to the 
no-duty rule be available on these facts? This author concludes that it 
should. Thus, by encouraging Othello, Iago demonstrated openly and 
unambiguously that he was apprised of the relevant facts and was capable 
of some type of positive intervention. Everyone knows that Iago was a 
conniving scoundrel, skilled in treachery. It may provide comfort to know 
that, for those same reasons, he was a tortfeasor as well.
B. Encouraging Others to Harm Themselves
1. The First Hypothetical: “Kill Yourself, You Loser!”
This example is inspired by a case of recent notoriety, in which a 
teenage girl, in the midst of breaking up with her boyfriend, successfully
                                                                                                                     
56. See AARON D. TWERSKI ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 74–75 (4th ed. 2017).
57. See id. (“An actor who intentionally causes physical harm is subject to liability for that 
harm.”).
58. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Desdemona clearly suffered mental distress 
leading up to, and including, her final encounter with Othello. On these facts, could a trier find 
Iago’s conduct “extreme and outrageous,” and Desdemona’s distress “extreme”?
59. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
60. As a successful enabler, Iago was guilty of misfeasance and would be liable for the 
harms he caused. Desdemona’s representative need not invoke a rescue theory based on 
nonfeasance.
61. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Given that Desdemona had only recently 
married Othello, almost certainly she and Iago did not have the necessary relationship.
62. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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encouraged him to commit suicide.63 She enabled him in this regard by 
explaining a method for him to use—inhaling carbon monoxide while 
seated in an idling truck within an enclosed garage—and telling him via 
cell phone to get back in the truck when he started to exit to safety.64 On 
these facts, the victim’s representatives should reach the trier of fact with 
a claim for battery in much the same manner that Desdemona’s parents
should if Iago’s efforts were a but-for cause of their daughter’s murder.65
The representatives would likely have a claim on behalf of the decedent 
for intentional infliction of mental suffering.66 These conclusions rest on 
traditional law and are fairly straightforward. But what if the girlfriend 
had not been an enabler? What if proof of a but-for connection between 
her encouragement and her boyfriend’s death was unavailable or 
unconvincing? On those assumed facts, would a claim for failure to 
rescue be made out, either on one or more of the three recognized 
exceptions to the traditional no-duty rule, or on the proposed fourth 
exception described in section A? Certainly the girlfriend’s relationship 
with the victim during their breakup did not support an expectation on his 
part that she would intervene to help him cope positively with his 
depression.67 Moreover, the girlfriend made no abandoned attempt at 
rescue that could have caused other would-be rescuers to rest on their 
oars.68 It could be argued that her previous conduct in terminating their 
relationship, which might be found to have caused her boyfriend to 
                                                                                                                     
63. See Carla Zavala, Comment, Manslaughter by Text: Is Encouraging Suicide 
Manslaughter?, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 297, 300–02 (2016).
64. Id. at 301, 302. The use of social media as a means to cause harm and influence others 
to behave badly is a growing problem. See generally Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of 
Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 845 (2010) (citing other recent sources regarding social media influencing harmful 
behavior).
65. Cf. supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing Iago’s inducement of Othello to 
harm Desdemona). Apparently, some state prosecutors are filing criminal charges against 
individuals who, by using opioids with overdose victims, are causing opioid-related deaths. See
Joseph Walker, Prosecutors Treat Opioid Overdoses as Homicides, Snagging Friends, Relatives,
WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/prosecutors-treat-opioid-overdoses-as-homicides-
snagging-friends-relatives-1513538404 [https://perma.cc/TD7D-TTJP] (last updated Dec. 17, 
2017, 11:12 PM).
66. For earlier examples see supra notes 17, 58 and accompanying text. The claim on behalf 
of the jilted boyfriend is stronger than the two previously considered.
67. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs might try to argue that their 
relationship before the breakup would support a rescue claim, but the couple discussed how he 
might kill himself almost from the time of their first meeting.
68. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. If her conduct had any effect on third parties,
it would be to put them on notice that the boyfriend needed help that she was not providing.
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require rescue, gave rise to a legal duty on her part to try to relieve his 
suicidal inclinations or to notify third parties.69
Assuming that neither the break-up nor the girlfriend’s subsequent 
encouragement was a but-for cause of her boyfriend’s death, and that the 
three traditional exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule are not 
available, would the boyfriend’s representatives have a claim based on
the earlier-proposed fourth exception?70 The answer depends on whether 
the girlfriend’s encouragement sufficiently identifies her as a defendant 
whose civil prosecution would not present problems of rule-application 
of the sort that often accompany a general duty to rescue, and whether a 
rescue attempt by her would have succeeded. Clearly the need to try to 
comfort a depressed person with whom one has a preexisting relationship, 
or at least to counsel him to seek parental or professional help, would be 
comprehensible to one in the girlfriend’s position. And her willingness to 
become involved in encouraging her boyfriend to kill himself indicates 
that she would have been mentally and emotionally (if not ethically) 
capable of responding to his anguish in a more positive manner. 
Moreover, a failure-to-rescue claim against her would relieve the court of 
the task of determining who, from among a potentially large number of 
possible defendants, may have breached duties to rescue. It is fair to 
assume that a number of people who knew the victim and observed his 
suffering might qualify as defendants under a general duty to rescue. The 
girlfriend’s conduct helps to single her out as the leading—possibly the 
only—candidate.71 Once again, it is her failure to help her boyfriend, not 
her encouraging him to kill himself, that constitutes the breach. But her 
encouragement, even if not a but-for cause of her boyfriend’s death, is 
the circumstance that makes it possible to apply to her the limited rescue 
rule fairly and consistently. 
2.  A Second Example: “I’ve Tried My Best to Help, 
But the Hell With It!”
In this hypothetical example, a mentor attempts, with apparently good 
intentions, to help a depressed acquaintance to rid himself of recurring 
thoughts of suicide. After a period during which the mentor urges her 
troubled friend to seek professional help, the mentor gives up and, out of 
a mixture of impatience and frustration, tells her friend, “You might as 
well go ahead and get it over with.” Later the same day, the friend kills 
                                                                                                                     
69. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
70. See supra text following note 45.
71. Cf. supra note 32 and accompanying text (stating that a general duty to rescue strangers 
would be unmanageable). From the standpoint of allocative efficiency, it could be said that, 
having intervened in managing her boyfriend’s state of mind, the marginal costs of being positive 
were lower for her than for those who had not intervened to begin with. See supra note 39 and 
accompanying text.
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himself and leaves a note making it clear that his friend’s harsh words 
pushed him over the brink. On these facts, and assuming no intent on the 
mentor’s part to cause her friend’s death, the decedent’s representatives 
could not make out an intentional tort. How should a court react to a 
negligent failure-to-rescue claim? One may assume that, given the suicide 
note, the plaintiff can make out but-for causation. Might this be an 
example of a well-intentioned actor beginning a rescue and then 
terminating the effort mid-way, leaving the victim in a worse position 
than before?72 Doctrinally, the plaintiffs’ problem would be showing that 
one or more would-be rescuers, realizing that the defendant was 
rendering counsel, rested on their oars, and that if someone else had 
stepped in, the suicide would not have occurred.73 The truly troublesome 
issue presented would not be whether the defendant owed a duty to 
undertake reasonable rescue74 but whether the defendant breached that 
duty. In this regard, the defendant did not fail to attempt rescue. But could 
she be found to have been negligent in her attempt to rescue her friend? 
Observe that this hypothetical introduces a consideration absent in the 
earlier examples. In the examples in the previous section, the defendant-
actors’ conduct—encouraging violent crimes—has no social value 
whatever. And in the first example in this section involving the girlfriend 
who acted in the meanest of spirits, the girlfriend’s conduct did not carry 
with it anything positive. By contrast, the instant example involves efforts 
by an actor dealing with a depressed colleague where the efforts began
with good intentions but ended badly. In assessing whether a trier of fact 
should be allowed to find the mentor negligent in her handling of the 
situation, the court should apply a common-sense standard of care that 
allows for nonprofessional defendants to make good faith errors in 
judgment. On the reasonable assumption that social benefits, as well as 
risks, accompany well-meaning attempts by laypersons to help others
escape the risks associated with severe depression,75 courts should avoid 
                                                                                                                     
72. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 42,
44(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
75. Obviously, it would be preferable for the decedent to have followed his friend’s advice 
and obtained professional help. But it must be true that, in a large majority of instances, well-
intentioned help from a friend is better than no help at all. See, e.g., Rachel Feintzeig, With 
Workplace Suicides Rising, Companies Plan for the Unthinkable, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-workplace-suicides-rising-companies-plan-for-the-
unthinkable-1516205932 (last updated Jan. 17, 2018, 4:45 PM) (describing trend toward large 
employers organizing in-house, first-response monitoring, and counseling in response to
workplace suicides); cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 355 (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that courts should not come down hard on those offering psychological 
counseling).
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taxing such attempts via a strictly-applied liability rule. Indeed, 
something approaching a formally-recognized privilege for laypersons in 
such situations to engage in lawful, good-faith counseling might be in 
order.76
II. LIABILITY OF BUSINESS ENTITIES THAT, THROUGH THEIR 
MARKETING PRACTICES, ENCOURAGE BAD BEHAVIOR
As noted at the outset, the most important distinction in this Article is 
between individual actors and business entities. With regard to individual 
actors who encourage others to behave badly, the doctrinal focus is on 
failure to rescue. In connection with business entities, a rescue analysis is 
inappropriate. The exposures of such entities should depend on a 
narrowly drawn version of negligent marketing.
A. Encouraging Actors to Cause Harm to Third Persons
1.  The First Hypothetical Example: Enabling Pill Mills77 and 
Unscrupulous Physicians to Promote Opioid Abuse
Opioid abuse and related deaths have increased exponentially in 
recent years, to the point of presenting a national health crisis.78 Under 
traditional products liability principles, pharmaceutical companies that 
manufacture opioid-based pain killers are exposed to liability when their 
products are defective at time of distribution.79 Thus, if at the time of sale 
                                                                                                                     
76. The modifier “lawful” is intended to exclude the unlicensed practice of medicine. The 
traditional parent-child immunity reflects some of these same concerns that might support a 
privilege in this context. See generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 434–38 (discussing 
intra-family immunity). Additionally, many good Samaritan statutes grant to rescuers immunities 
from fault-based liability. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1799.102 (West 2018). See 
generally 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §§ 21.01–.05 
(Gordon L. Ohlsson ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2018) (1960) (discussing good Samaritan 
statutes).
77. See Khary K. Rigg et al., Prescription Drug Abuse & Diversion: Role of the Pain Clinic,
40 J. DRUG ISSUES 681, 682 (2010) (“The term ‘pill mill’ is typically used to describe a doctor, 
clinic, or pharmacy that is prescribing or dispensing controlled prescription drugs 
inappropriately.”).
78. See What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/7XVY-RWGM] 
(last updated Sept. 19, 2018). See generally Michael E. Schatman & Lynn R. Webster, The Health 
Insurance Industry: Perpetuating the Opioid Crisis Through Policies of Cost-Containment and 
Profitability, 8 J. PAIN RES. 153 (2015) (containing many citations of secondary sources relating 
to the crisis).
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). See 
generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 428–
58 (8th ed. 2016) (explaining liability for prescription drugs).
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the drugs contain unintended, harmful ingredients,80 are designed badly,81
or are distributed without adequate warnings,82 the companies will be 
liable for harms caused by such defects. But product defects are not 
causing the opioid epidemic. The drugs do not contain unintended, 
harmful ingredients, are not defectively designed, and are sold with 
adequate warnings. Rather, the categorically addictive qualities of 
socially valuable, non-defective pain killers are combining with the 
proneness to addiction of many consumers to cause the epidemic. 
Assuming that American courts will not attempt to hold such products 
categorically defective based on the generic risks that such products 
unavoidably present,83 and observing that the rescue claims would not 
increase plaintiffs’ chances of recovery given that the defendants’ 
products actually cause the victims’ harms,84 the only potential path to 
recovery would seem to be claims based on inappropriate marketing.85
The plaintiffs’ argument in support of inappropriate marketing claims 
based on the encouragement of bad behavior would go something like 
this: The pharmaceutical companies that distribute opioid pain killers are 
aware of the opioid crisis and the role of pill mills and rogue physicians 
in promoting, at the fringes of the criminal law, massive overconsumption 
of such addictive drugs. In the course of distributing their products, the 
drug companies also know that some middlemen entities are purchasing 
such large quantities of the drugs as to identify them as possible operators 
of pill mills. And yet the drug companies have continued to promote their 
products without taking adequate steps either to intervene by refusing to 
do business with questionable distributees or to notify authorities so that 
they might enforce relevant criminal regulations. Indeed, a recent report 
by the minority staff of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee indicates that some opioid manufacturers have 
contributed to nonprofit advocacy groups that promote opioid use as an 
                                                                                                                     
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(b)(1).
81. Id. § 6(b)(2).
82. Id. § 6(b)(3).
83. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American 
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263
(1991) (discussing how American courts have refused to impose strict liability on distributors of 
nondefective but generically dangerous products).
84. Cf. supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining that a claim based on misfeasance 
renders a failure to rescue claim unnecessary). The point here is not that causation-based claims 
will necessarily succeed but rather that the availability of such claims renders rescue superfluous.
85. See generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 413–14 (discussing inappropriate 
marketing claims); Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-Defective Products: An 
Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907, 908–09 (2002)
(discussing the theory of negligent marketing).
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effective means of chronic pain management.86 While the amounts of 
such contributions appear modest in relation to the size of the opioid 
abuse problem ($8.9 million over six years), the Report advocates more 
open disclosures of such industry activity.87 Traditionally, an actor 
intends consequences that are substantially certain to follow from the 
actor’s conduct.88 Thus, by shipping drugs to suspect middlemen, drug 
companies might be said to be intentionally encouraging and enabling 
opioid abuse. However, in many instances of harmful opioid abuse, 
plaintiffs will not be able to show that it was substantially certain that 
abuse would result from the manufacturers’ marketing techniques and 
thus intentional torts will not be made out.89 The obvious alternative 
would be claims for negligent marketing.90 Once again, observe that 
plaintiffs’ causes of action in this regard do not include failure-to-rescue 
claims; the plaintiffs in these cases complain of misfeasance rather than 
nonfeasance.91 Functionally, negligent-marketing claims in the form of 
negligent enablement are, on a grander scale, akin to traditional claims 
for negligent entrustment.92 Over the past several decades, plaintiffs have 
brought actions against entire industries for the negligent marketing of 
unavoidably dangerous, non-defective products, but they have been met 
with only limited success.93 The courts that have denied recovery as a 
matter of law have done so largely on social policy grounds.94
                                                                                                                     
86. See Jeanne Whalen, Drugmakers Funded Groups Promoting Opioid Use, Senator’s 
Report Finds, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/drugmakers-funded-groups-promoting-
opioid-use-senators-report-finds-1518482717 (last updated Feb. 12, 2018, 9:12 PM).
87. Id.
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1(b)
(AM. LAW INST. 2010); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in 
Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2001). Because 
encouragement requires intent to influence, defendants held liable for negligent marketing are in
some instances being held liable for enablement, rather than encouragement, of bad behavior. See 
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 83, at 1138–43.
89. See Ausness, supra note 85, at 913–14.
90. Id.
91. Cf. supra notes 60, 84 and accompanying text (explaining that the availability of 
misfeasance and causation-based claims renders nonfeasance claims unnecessary).
92. Negligent entrustment typically involves a defendant who negligently provides another 
with a dangerous instrumentality which the other employs to harm himself or a third person. See
Henry Woods, Negligent Entrustment: Evaluation of a Frequently Overlooked Source of 
Additional Liability, 20 ARK. L. REV. 101, 101–02 (1966). This analogy highlights the fact that 
negligent marketing involves enablement as well as encouragement.
93. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., The Impropriety of Punitive Damages in Mass 
Torts, 52 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3009389 [https://perma.cc/TZ9W-GSZS] (discussing several examples of claims against 
industries for nondefective products).
94. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1058, 1067–68 (N.Y. 
2001). In this case, a number of plaintiffs sought to hold forty-nine handgun manufacturers liable 
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Before turning to the broader social policy issues, it will be helpful to 
understand the conceptual and administrative difficulties that negligent
marketing claims present. One such difficulty concerns the question of 
what the drug companies might do differently to protect overdose
victims. Marginally better warnings would not help much, if at all, nor do 
reasonable alternative designs appear to be available.95 If the industry 
stopped distributing addictive pain killers or placed severe limits on 
distribution it would interfere with the millions of consumers who require 
access to legitimate pain management programs.96 Notifying regulatory 
authorities regarding suspicious distributees would, if limited to fairly 
obvious suspects, tell the agencies little that they did not already know 
and, if expanded even slightly to include distributees, would threaten to 
overwhelm regulatory agencies with a flood of useless information. And 
expanded duties to warn regulators would threaten to disrupt legitimate 
pain management operations which the drug companies might falsely 
identify as illegitimate out of an abundance of caution. Given these 
difficulties, it is not surprising that courts thus far have refused to hold 
corporate defendants liable for failing to monitor the middlemen and end
users of opioid drugs or other inherently dangerous products.97
                                                                                                                     
for the harms caused by handgun violence. Id. at 1058. In refusing to recognize claims for 
negligent marketing, the court observed: “This case challenges us to rethink traditional notions of 
duty, liability, and causation.” Id. at 1068.
95. Regarding warnings, drug companies already provide them; moreover, the risks 
associated with consuming addictive opioids are by now obvious to almost all concerned.
Manufacturers do not owe a duty to warn of risks that are obvious and generally known. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(j) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). Regarding design, 
adequate warnings to prescribing physicians have traditionally constituted a bar to design-based 
claims. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 YALE 
L.J. 151, 171 n.83. (2001). Moreover, the defective design requirements cannot be satisfied—
opioids are categorically addictive. See supra notes 81, 83 and accompanying text.
96. See generally Joseph B. Prater, West Virginia’s Painful Settlement: How the Oxycontin 
Phenomenon and Unconventional Theories of Tort Liability May Make Pharmaceutical 
Companies Liable for Black Markets, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1409, 1436 (2006) (“Increased litigation 
could serve to further chill pharmaceutical companies’ development and promotion of narcotic 
painkillers and, in turn, further the ‘chronic undertreatment of pain.’”). In addition to the negative 
effects on manufacturers, the author argues that the general aura of illegality would have a chilling 
effect on physicians who would refuse to prescribe powerful narcotics to patients with legitimate 
needs. Id. at 1437.
97. For evidence that a liability landslide may be around the corner, see Dennis Kneale, The 
Opioid Crisis Has Plaintiff Lawyers Smelling Cash, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-opioid-crisis-has-plaintiff-lawyers-smelling-cash-1515024267
(showing possible parallel to tobacco litigation). For reported decisions dealing with opioid abuse,
see Prater, supra note 96, at 1417–20. For decisions dealing with firearms, see Ausness, supra
note 85, at 917–36. For decisions across a spectrum of product categories, see James A. 
Henderson, Jr., Sellers of Safe Products Should not be Required to Rescue Users from Risks 
Presented by Other, More Dangerous Products, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 595, 608 (2008).
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Another problem accompanying negligent marketing claims relates to 
proximate causation. Even if drug companies might have made marginal 
adjustments to help reduce the risk of opioid abuse, and even if courts 
were willing to recognize the relevant duties, courts would likely find that 
other causative variables overwhelm any contributions from drug 
companies. These variables include insatiable appetites and willful 
misuse on the part of addicts; unscrupulous physicians who prescribe 
excessive opioid drugs to dependent, demanding patients; illegal 
smugglers and producers of opiates and derivatives; and huge profits to 
be made by pill mill operators and rogue physicians that finance efforts 
to evade both criminal and civil regulators. Given the unavoidably 
speculative nature of the misuse and causation issues, it is understandable 
why courts have concluded that legitimate drug companies’ marketing 
practices are not a legal or proximate cause of plaintiffs’ opioid abuse.98
From a broader social policy perspective, attempting to pressure the 
pharmaceutical industry to perform as a watchdog in connection with the 
opioid crisis is a bad idea.99 As indicated, the pharmaceutical industry can 
do little, at least at acceptable cost, to moderate opioid abuse. Thus, 
successful negligent marketing claims would, in reality, impose a 
variation of strict enterprise liability. This author has elsewhere described 
how the plaintiffs’ bar employs the concept of negligent marketing and 
other novel legal theories in attempting to impose the functional 
equivalent of enterprise liability for all the harms for which various 
socially beneficial and lawful industries are but-for causes.100 Given the 
limits on the drug companies’ capacity to moderate opioid abuse, together 
with the reality that marginal increases in price will probably not 
significantly lower consumption levels of legally distributed opioids that 
are being abused,101 imposing strict liability on drug companies will not 
make America a safer or better place. Instead, especially when 
accompanied by claims for punitive damages, strict liability places in the 
hands of specialist trial lawyers the means by which to hold entire 
                                                                                                                     
98. See, e.g., Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 703–04 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
See generally Prater supra note 96, at 1419 (“Courts have been reluctant to find 
causation . . . . The common thread between courts’ rejection of nearly all [drug overdose] claims 
is the difficulty in establishing causation . . . .”).
99. For an article arguing against the watchdog approach to industry-wide tort liability, see 
Henderson, supra note 97, at 601–13.
100. See Henderson, supra note 93 (manuscript at 16).
101. The assumptions here are that insurance covers much of the cost of prescription drugs, 
demand by addicted abusers is relatively inelastic, and, in any event, the prices of legally-
distributed opioids will not greatly exceed those of illegally-distributed substitutes. For an
empirical analysis arguing that drug companies and health insurers try to keep the prices of opioids 
as low as possible, see Schatman & Webster, supra note 78, at 155.
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industries for ransom via so-called settlement class actions in which the 
major beneficiaries are the lawyers, not the clients.102
The hard truth is that many products and services that provide 
significant social benefits—for example, prescription drugs, alcoholic 
beverages, fast food, soft drinks, firearms, sports equipment, and health 
care103—also present generic risks of harm that can be avoided only 
through more careful, or reduced, use and consumption. By purporting to 
help optimize levels of use and consumption, broad-based, judicially
applied enterprise liability may be attractive in theory.104 However, in 
practice, enterprise liability is problematic and fails to accomplish its 
ostensible objectives.105 For these reasons, despite what appeared to be a 
promising future fifty or so years ago, judicially crafted enterprise 
liability has never taken hold in this country.106 Formally constrained 
versions of strict liability appear to have succeeded here and there.107 But 
courts have never embraced a broad-based system of the sort proposed 
by the plaintiffs’ bar in response to the opioid crisis.
2.  A Second Example: “Prescribe Lots of This Drug and We’ll Send 
You on a Cruise!”
In keeping with tradition and administrative regulations, licensed 
physicians decide which drugs, in what dosages, to prescribe for their 
patients.108 Presumably these decisions are made in the patients’ best 
interests based on risk-benefit information supplied by the manufacturers 
and personal facts determined by the physicians. As reflected in reported 
decisions, drug companies should explain to physicians both the benefits 
and the risks associated with drug consumption, presumably without the 
sort of puffery that invariably accompanies commercial advertising of 
                                                                                                                     
102. See Henderson, supra note 93 (manuscript at 36).
103. For a discussion of these specific product categories, see Henderson, supra note 93
(manuscript at 15–19).
104. James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 382 
(2002) [hereinafter Henderson, Why Negligence]. See generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 
79, at 470–74 (reviewing courts’ approach to products liability cases in the context of food, 
nonprescription drugs, and cosmetics).
105. See generally Henderson, Why Negligence, supra note 104, at 390–400 (arguing that 
broad-based strict liability for enterprises is not administratively viable).
106. Id. at 382–85 (discussing how strict liability has not grown in the last half-century).
107. Id. at 400–02 (providing examples such as strict liability for manufacturing defects, 
ultra-hazardous activities, and workplace injuries).
108. HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 429; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PROD. LIAB. § 6(d)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (explaining that manufacturers will be held liable if 
they fail to provide instructions or warnings to the prescribing healthcare provider).
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nonprescription products.109 The reality surrounding the marketing of 
prescription drugs appears to be quite different. Credible sources report 
that drug companies spend large sums to influence physicians to prescribe 
their drugs, sometimes in ways that do not serve the best interests of their 
patients.110 Should someone who has suffered harm from taking a 
prescription drug have a civil cause of action against the manufacturer if 
she can prove that the manufacturer sent her prescribing physician and 
his family on a two-week cruise to Hawaii for having prescribed large 
quantities of the same drug?
To succeed with such a cause against the manufacturer, in addition to 
the manufacturer’s intention or fault, a plaintiff must establish 
misprescription by the physician in the particular case, a causal link 
between the physician’s receipt of the cruise and the misprescription, and 
a causal connection between that misprescription and the plaintiff’s 
harm.111 A plaintiff might prove that the drug company’s incentive 
program caused physicians generally, including the plaintiff’s physician
in particular, to prescribe higher amounts of the drug in the aggregate 
than might be expected. But for an individual patient to show that the 
incentive program caused her particular harm would be difficult. The 
proper type and level of prescription in any given instance is a judgment 
call. Several different drugs will typically have been appropriate, and 
acceptable dosages will in each case fall within a range.112 A physician
could earn a valuable cruise by routinely choosing a defendant’s drug 
over rival drugs and by prescribing at the high end of the proper range of 
dosage for every patient, without a particular plaintiff being able to prove 
in any given instance that the incentives caused her doctor to 
overprescribe the drug for her. 
Moreover, even if a patient were to surmount such difficulties and 
show that the physician in a particular case misprescribed in response to 
the defendant company’s sales promotions, the plaintiff would be 
                                                                                                                     
109. Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 569 (3d Cir. 1990) (distinguishing 
puffery from express warranty), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). For the 
general rule regarding prescription drugs, see Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991
(8th Cir. 1969).
110. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 414. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Will 
More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort Liability for Prescription Drug 
Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 133–35 (2002) (arguing that pharmaceutical 
companies “overpromote” their products to doctors).
111. See generally TWERSKI ET AL., supra note 56, at ch. 5 (discussing proximate cause); 
David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1673, 1686 (2007)
(listing the elements of negligence, including proximate cause).
112. For a discussion of situations in which two or more drugs are simultaneously available 
and how it is the physician’s responsibility to decide which one to prescribe for a given patient,
see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 95, at 155–59.
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required to prove that a lower dosage of defendant’s drug, a substitute 
equivalent drug, or no drug at all, would have avoided plaintiff’s harm.113
Thus, although this hypothetical example involves a deplorable conflict 
of interest and a significant waste of resources, civil liability, focusing on 
harm to individuals does not represent an effective or adequate regulatory 
response.114 Perhaps that is why civil claims against manufacturers based 
on overpromotion have only rarely succeeded in the real world.115
Criminal regulations would represent a more effective approach to this 
problem of curbing patterns of corporate behavior that are harmful in the 
aggregate but difficult to prove in individual instances.116
B. Encouraging Victims to Harm Themselves: Promoting Dangerous 
Modes of Product Use and Consumption
The main feature that distinguishes the examples in this section from 
those in the preceding section is clear. There, the plaintiffs charge 
pharmaceutical companies with encouraging and enabling middlemen 
and physicians to harm third-party victims. Here, product manufacturers 
aim their marketing directly at consumers who themselves become 
victims. As in the preceding section, opportunities arise for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to apply legal theories of recovery inventively. For example, 
under products law, when a manufacturer distributes a product without 
adequately warning users and consumers of nonobvious risks or without 
proper instructions regarding risk-avoidance measures, it is liable for 
harms caused by its failure to instruct and warn.117 It might be argued 
that, a manner analogous to opioid drug manufacturers who knowingly 
distribute their products to suspect middlemen,118 by knowingly 
distributing products without adequate instructions and warnings, 
manufacturers encourage dangerous product misuse. But failure to 
                                                                                                                     
113. This is what is commonly referred to as “actual,” or “but-for,” causation. See
HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at ch. 2.
114. See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against 
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1165 (2014) (“[T]he overall effectiveness of 
civil litigation in this area is highly questionable.”).
115. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 414 (describing a “lack of recent success” in 
cases involving claims based on overpromotion).
116. Although both criminal and tort law aim to reinforce social norms, substantive criminal 
regulation aims primarily to protect social welfare via state actions rather than, as with tort, the 
rights of individual victims via private actions. For a useful analysis of the crime/tort distinction 
and the overlap between the systems, see generally Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort 
Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 730–32 (2008).
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §§ 1, 2(c), 6(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1998); HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 428–44.
118. See supra text following note 88.
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adequately instruct and warn are, independent of any collateral 
encouragement to behave badly, sufficient grounds for liability.119
The element of encouragement as a basis of liability, independent of 
failure to warn, is clearer when product advertising enters the picture. 
This Article will consider two examples. First, product manufacturers 
sometimes employ aggressive advertising that encourages dangerous 
modes of product use or consumption, thereby placing unsophisticated 
product purchasers (or third-party bystanders) at elevated risk of harm.
Second, pharmaceutical companies frequently advertise their drugs 
directly to consumers, touting the benefits (while arguably playing down 
the risks) provided by their products, thereby breaking with the tradition 
of aiming prescription drug advertising only at prescribing physicians. 
The discussion that follows considers each of these examples in turn.
1.  The First Hypothetical Example: “You Can Drive This Vehicle 
Anywhere You Have the Guts to Take It!”
Imagine an American manufacturer of all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) 
advertising that its vehicles are designed to operate effectively in the most 
difficult off-road terrains imaginable, strongly implying that only persons 
of skill and courage will be able to meet the challenges presented by the
vehicles’ superb engineering. Imagine also that the purchaser of such a 
vehicle, motivated by the implicit “we dare you!” message in the 
advertising, takes the ATV into a terrible place, which results in terrible 
harm to the purchaser. Should the injured purchaser have a cause of 
action against the manufacturer for encouraging him to behave badly? 
Before responding to this question, it will be useful to consider 
alternative theories of recovery that might be available to the plaintiff on 
these facts. For example, would the ATV purchaser have a cause based 
on breach of express warranty? In this context, the advertising would 
constitute an express warranty by the seller if the assertions of ruggedness 
constitute an affirmation of fact or promise that became part of the basis 
of the bargain between the parties.120 Even though the assertions occurred 
in advertisements outside the four corners of the contract of sale, as long
as the purchaser was aware of the advertising at the time of sale the 
advertising became part of the basis of the bargain.121 The problem for 
the plaintiff would be convincing the court that the assertions regarding 
ruggedness constitute affirmations of fact or promises rather than mere 
product puffery—exaggerations of product value that no reasonable 
                                                                                                                     
119. See supra text accompanying note 117.
120. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
121. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 567–68 (3d Cir. 1990), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
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person would take literally.122 Although several earlier decisions on 
similar facts held for plaintiffs when the expected harm was especially 
great,123 recent decisions have reflected greater judicial skepticism.124
Would the plaintiff have a claim that the manufacturer failed to warn 
regarding the risks of driving in very rugged terrain, thereby rendering 
the product defective at the time of sale?125 The major problem is that the 
risks posed by dangerous terrain may be sufficiently obvious to negate 
breach of the duty to warn.126 By contrast, in connection with alleged 
breaches of express warranty, if an affirmation or promise escapes being 
deemed puffery the obviousness of the relevant risks should not bar 
recovery.127 In effect, the manufacturer who expressly warrants safe 
product use has promised as much, regardless of the fact that the relevant 
risks are fairly obvious.128 Would the plaintiff in the ATV example have 
a claim for defective design? Almost always, a plaintiff’s success with 
design claims depends on his ability to show that a reasonable alternative 
design that would have reduced or avoided the plaintiff’s harm was 
available.129 Most design claims have nothing to do with encouraging bad 
behavior.130 But a few courts have toyed with the notion that the design 
                                                                                                                     
122. See generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 394 (discussing the distinction 
between express warranties and puffery).
123. See, e.g., Pau v. Yosemite Park, 928 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the 
bicycle leasing company’s brochure asserted that the dangerous trail on which plaintiff 
accidentally died was “a safe and enjoyable cycling area”); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 
F.2d 352, 358 (6th Cir. 1978) (stating that the drain cleaner was advertised as “safe” but badly 
disfigured a child).
124. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 3:13-CV-498-CRS, 2014 WL 1319519, at
*1, *8 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2014) (stating that advertisement praising vehicle’s quality, safety, and 
reliability were “mere opinions, used to promote sales”); Wojcik v. Manville, No. L-373-07, 2010 
WL 322893, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 29, 2010) (stating that statements that helmet 
was “one of the best” and “great” were mere opinion and not a warranty).
125. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §§ 1, 2(c), 6(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
(listing failure to warn as a basis of liability for drug manufacturers); supra note 79–82 and 
accompanying text (explaining that failure to warn may be a basis of liability for drug 
manufacturers).
126. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d.
128. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); Cipollone v. Liggett 
Grp., Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 569 n.34 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that it is possible for a purchaser to rely 
on an express warranty that he knows to be false), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 504 
(1992).
129. Even if the risks associated with product use or consumption are obvious, the 
manufacturer will be subject to liability if the plaintiff proves that a reasonable alternative design 
was available at time of sale. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b); see also 
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 54, at 1401 (“In the current American products liability system, 
a plaintiff attacks a product design by proving that the manufacturer could have adopted a 
reasonable alternative design . . . that would have prevented the plaintiff’s injury.”).
130. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 446–47. 
25
Henderson, Jr.: Civil Liability for Encouraging Bad Behavior: From Cheering at a
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
148 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
of some products—semi-automatic handguns with features that make 
them especially attractive to criminals—are inherently, and thus 
intentionally, aimed at encouraging their users to behave badly.131
Because these claims seek to impose what is referred to as “category 
liability,” where reasonable alternative designs cannot be proven, courts 
and commentators have by and large refused to recognize them.132
Returning to the question earlier deferred, should the plaintiff in the 
ATV hypothetical recover on the ground that the manufacturer 
encouraged him to behave badly with the vehicle and thereby harm 
himself? This author urges courts generally to refuse to recognize such 
claims. As with the earlier examples of negligent marketing, in which 
plaintiffs allege that pharmaceutical companies fail to monitor 
distribution and disrupt the operation of pill mills,133 it would be difficult 
for courts to distinguish between legitimate efforts to promote and 
illegitimate efforts to overpromote inherently dangerous products.134 The 
temptation would be for courts to reason backwards to conclusions of 
corporate fault from the facts of foolish product uses combined with 
serious harms.135 If this concern should prove well-founded, and 
aggressive advertising followed by serious harms invariably provided 
plaintiffs with grounds for reaching triers of fact, the result would closely 
resemble the sort of strict enterprise liability criticized earlier.
Moreover, even if courts could fairly and consistently distinguish 
between acceptable and unacceptable product promotion, the difficult 
issue of causation would remain. In a typical case, the victim or his 
representatives will insist that the advertisements inspired the vehicle 
driver to behave badly. However, self-serving testimony must be doubted 
on its face. And even if the plaintiff could show that the advertising 
caused the plaintiff’s bad behavior, triers of fact could be expected to 
                                                                                                                     
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e; see, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, 
Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 163 (Ct. App. 1999), rev’d, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001). The ATV design 
in the hypothetical example carries with it a bit of built-in “dare you,” but the challenge in the 
advertising is required to make a plausible case. See generally Ausness, supra note 85, at 941–42
(pointing out a case in which the design features of a semiautomatic pistol were alleged to have 
made the product more attractive to criminals).
132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e. See generally Henderson 
& Twerski, supra note 83, at 1300–07 (discussing problems with risk-utility product-category 
liability that render it unmanageable for the courts).
133. See supra Part II.
134. This difficulty is ubiquitous in tort. Compare the problems that arise when courts 
distinguish between express warranties and mere puffery. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79,
at 394; supra note 122 and accompanying text.
135. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 394; cf. supra note 123–24 and accompanying
text (explaining that courts in earlier cases would find for plaintiffs when the expected harm was 
exceptionally high, but that recent decisions have been less likely to follow this approach).
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weigh plaintiff’s contributory negligence.136 When the targets of the 
advertising are non-adults or persons otherwise uniquely vulnerable to 
suggestions of potentially self-destructive behavior, this proposed subset 
of negligent marketing might make sense based on its similarity to 
negligent entrustment.137 But with those possible exceptions, courts 
should leave issues regarding product advertising aimed at encouraging 
bad behavior to the express warranty and failure-to-warn theories 
considered earlier.138
2.  A Second Example: “Ask Your Doctor to Prescribe This Wonderful 
Drug. Don’t Take ‘No’ for an Answer.”
American courts have traditionally implemented the learned 
intermediary rule, under which pharmaceutical companies advertise their 
drugs, including warnings, to physicians who decide which drugs to 
prescribe to which of their patients.139 Having adequately warned the 
prescribing physicians, drug companies owe no duty to directly warn the 
patients who consume the drugs nor, under traditional law, are the 
companies liable for defective designs.140 The rationale for this “learned 
intermediary rule” is that the prescribing physician possesses the 
necessary expertise that patients lack and physicians can be trusted as 
professionals to act in their patients’ best interests.141 The rule is subject 
to a number of exceptions, most of which are based on governmental 
regulations.142 The exception of interest here is based on the fact that not 
long ago, drug companies began to promote the benefits of their 
prescription products by advertising directly to consumers.143 Some 
courts and commentators suggest that when drug companies engage in 
                                                                                                                     
136. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 127–35.
137. See Woods, supra note 92.
138. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text. The rules of decision in those contexts 
are sufficiently specific to be manageable.
139. For a summary of the learned intermediary rule, see Sheryl Calabro, Breaking the Shield 
of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Placing the Blame Where It Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
2241, 2249–53 (2004); see also HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 428–35 (explaining the 
learned intermediary rule); Ausness, supra note 110, at 106–07 (discussing the learned 
intermediary rule and prescription drugs). 
140. See Ausness, supra note 110, at 106 & n.67. The physicians will presumably share 
approximate information with their patients. Regarding drug design liability, see generally
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 95, at 155–59.
141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(d)(1) cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
1998); Ausness, supra note 110, at 108–09.
142. See Ausness, supra note 110, at 110–13; Calabro, supra note 139, at 2254–56.
143. See Ausness, supra note 110, at 98–99.
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this sort of direct advertising, they must provide appropriate warnings to 
the consumers.144
The problem with direct prescription drug advertising relates to the 
broader issue addressed in this Article. It may be argued that by urging 
consumers to pressure their physicians to prescribe certain drugs, the drug 
companies are encouraging those consumers to behave badly in ways that 
place them at unreasonable risk of suffering harm. When a patient urges 
her physician to prescribe a drug the patient has seen advertised on 
television, such overtures may affect the physician’s decisions in ways 
that are not in the best interest of the patient.145 Physicians should, in 
theory, resist prescribing drugs of questionable value. But they are, as the 
saying goes, “only human.”146
Should courts recognize patients’ claims against drug companies 
whose aggressive direct advertising, even if accompanied by adequate 
(albeit technical) warnings, causes patients to persuade their physicians 
to prescribe inappropriate drugs that cause the patients to suffer harm? 
Plaintiffs face several problems. The most serious problem relates to the 
fact that a plaintiff’s claim that a physician succumbed to the patient’s 
entreaties constitutes a claim of medical malpractice against the 
physician.147 Even if the patient initially brought action only against the 
drug company, the company would implead the physician, who would 
ultimately share the burden of liability.148 Assuming that physicians 
generally refuse to give in to patient pressure to prescribe drugs that are 
only marginally useful and may be downright hazardous, presumably
                                                                                                                     
144. See, e.g., Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1259 (N.J. 1999) (stating that when 
manufacturers advertise directly to consumers, they must directly warn consumers); Calabro, 
supra note 139, at 2300 (explaining that a new direct-advertising exception is warranted); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6 cmt. e (“Case law supports the position taken 
in §6(d)(2) that warnings should be given directly to patients when the manufacturer is aware that 
health care medical providers will not be in a position to play the role of the learned 
intermediary.”). See generally Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug 
Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829, 836–38 (1991) 
(discussing that a strong case can be made for recognizing an exception to the rule).
145. See Ausness, supra note 110, at 110 & nn.90–91.
146. See Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 25 AM. J.
L. & MED. 149, 157–58 (1999). If one focuses on the physician’s behavior, rather than the 
patient’s, this fact pattern might fit in the previous section A—encouraging actors to act badly in 
harming third-person victims. But because the advertising here is aimed at consumers, it is more 
comfortable to include the fact pattern here in section B.
147. Assuming that the manufacturer provided adequate warnings to the physician, the latter 
would be liable for medical malpractice along with the manufacturer for failing to adequately 
warn the consumer/patient. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1261 (considering whether physician’s 
negligence should exonerate manufacturer). 
148. Id. at 1263 (“Pharmaceutical manufacturers may seek contribution, indemnity or 
exoneration because of the physician’s deficient role in prescribing that drug.”).
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there would be few claims against manufacturers.149 Regarding claims 
that survive defendants’ motions to bar liability, a combination of 
sympathy for the physician150 and impatience with pushy, contributorily
negligent plaintiffs151 would reduce the likelihood of a plaintiff’s victory 
at trial.
Such claims might be deemed worthwhile even if they were to result 
in liability only in egregious cases. But threatening physicians with 
liability might generate perverse, unintended consequences that arguably 
warrant denying all such claims as a matter of law. For example, were 
courts to allow such claims, prescribing physicians might respond 
strategically, employing modes of defensive medicine.152 Thus, 
whenever a patient forcefully importunes her doctor to prescribe an 
inherently dangerous but beneficial drug that the doctor might well have 
chosen even if the patient had not asked, the doctor may tend to choose 
an alternative, marginally less suitable course of treatment out of concern 
over potential exposure to liability for having given in to the patient’s 
demands.153 Requiring drug companies to provide appropriately 
attention-grabbing warnings in their direct advertising would help to 
reduce any pressures on physicians to behave strategically;154 but query 
whether laypersons are capable of processing highly technical 
information.155 In any event, almost no litigation involving direct 
                                                                                                                     
149. If many of these claims reach the trier(s) of fact, a form of enterprise liability may 
develop. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
150. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1263–64 (reflecting sympathy for the beleaguered physician in 
these situations).
151. See Ausness, supra note 85, at 110–13; Calabro, supra note 139, at 2254–56, 2315. See
generally Laura D. Hermer & Howard Brody, Defensive Medicine, Cost Containment, and 
Reform, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 470, 471 (2010) (discussing the costs and policy implications 
of defensive medicine). 
152. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Learned Hand’s Paradox: An Essay on Custom 
in Negligence Law, 105 CAL. L. REV. 165, 175 (2017) (stating defensive medicine usually takes 
the form of overinvestment in care generated by the availability of health-care insurance).
153. Calabro, supra note 139, at 2296–98. This is a possibility as long as the substitute drug 
is an appropriate choice for the patient. Cf. supra note 111 and accompanying text (comparing 
plaintiff’s requirement to show causal connection between misprescription and plaintiff’s harm).
154. See Ausness, supra note 110, at 122 (stating that not only might one expect patients to 
be more circumspect in raising the possibility of the physician’s prescribing advertised drugs, but 
the physicians could point to the warnings by way of deflecting patients’ demands).
155. See Ausness, supra note 110, at 108–09 (“Because the physician is medically trained 
and the patient is not, in most cases, the patient must rely on the physician to choose the most 
appropriate treatment. . . . [Moreover,] some patients might overreact to consumer-oriented 
warnings and fail to seek proper medical treatment.”); Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs 
to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 158–59 (1997)
(“[B]ecause of the complexity of risk information about prescription drugs, comprehension 
problems [would cause difficulties] for lay patients.”).
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advertising has occurred156 since the publication, approximately twenty 
years ago, of the leading decision imposing a duty on manufacturers to 
directly warn consumers about the risks accompanying publicly-
advertised prescription drugs.157 Again, the proposed cause of action 
being considered is not based on drug companies’ failing to warn. Rather, 
it is based on the companies’ overpromotion through direct advertising, 
thereby encouraging patients to interfere with their physicians’ decision 
processes. For the reasons indicated, courts should reject such claims as 
a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The important distinction in this Article is between individual 
encouragers of bad behavior and business-entity encouragers.158 With a 
proposed new exception to the traditional no-duty-to-rescue rule—one 
that applies mainly to individuals—this analysis places that group of 
actors in a difficult position. When individuals encourage bad behavior, 
they invariably intend for that behavior to occur—witness the 
cheerleaders at a gang rape.159 If their conduct is a but-for condition of 
the harm-causing bad behavior, the actors are enablers and are subject to 
liability based on classic intentional tort. On the other hand, if their 
encouragement is not a but-for condition of the bad behavior, the 
proposed new exception to the no-duty-to-rescue rule exposes them to 
negligence-based liability. Those who encourage and enable others to 
cause harm by behaving badly are themselves, “bad actors.” This Article
argues that they should be tortfeasors as well.
Regarding business entities who promote bad behavior—witness drug 
companies that allegedly encourage and enable opioid abuse and the 
operation of pill mills160—this Article argues against expanding existing 
exposures to liability. After all, the same marketing practices that some 
might characterize as intentionally or negligently promoting bad behavior 
will appear to others to constitute lawful efforts to promote socially 
beneficial goods and services. Instead, courts should cautiously defer to 
                                                                                                                     
156. See State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 903, 905 (W. Va. 
2007), superseded by statute, W. VA. CODE § 55-7-30 (2017), as recognized in J.C. v. Pfizer, Inc., 
814 S.E.2d 234 (W. Va. 2018); HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 79, at 443 (“Perez . . . has not been 
influential. Only one state court has followed it.”).
157. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1263 (N.J. 1999); see also Ausness, 
supra note 110, at 98 (discussing drug companies’ discovery that they could expand the market 
for their products by advertising directly to consumers).
158. For a provocative article arguing that the benefit from harmful activity determines the 
form and substance of tort liability for tort claims between private individuals, fairness principles 
control, and for claims involving public/business entities, efficiency principles control, see Alex 
Stein, The Domain of Torts, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 611 (2017).
159. See supra text accompanying note 23.
160. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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existing combinations of traditional tort, competitive markets, and 
administrative regulations to maintain the proper boundaries of liability 
for harm caused by the promotion of consumer goods and services. The 
justification for these deferrals lies in the understandable tendency of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to try to expand new theories of tort to establish broad 
systems of enterprise liability. This tendency is particularly strong in 
connection with new theories, such as negligent marketing, that rest in 
part on assertions that commercial defendants are misleading the public.
While defensible in theory, in actual practice enterprise liability in 
these contexts would be unmanageable, inefficient, and unfair. Not 
surprisingly, court-made enterprise liability has never taken hold in this 
country. But that does not prevent plaintiffs from trying. Thus, American 
procedural processes—especially those supporting mass torts—have 
matured to the point that specialists among the organized plaintiffs’ bar 
can plausibly transform any substantive foothold into a mass tort platform 
for running blackmail and ransom schemes on a very large scale. Even as 
this Article advocates expanding the liabilities of individuals who 
encourage bad behavior in nonbusiness settings, it argues against doing 
so with respect to commercial entities that distribute and promote goods 
and services. Most individual encouragers are mean-spirited malcontents 
who intend to cause harm. Business entities alleged to encourage and 
enable bad behavior are typically promoting goods and services in ways 
that benefit many consumers and help to expand the economy. The 
former, with few exceptions, deserve to be held civilly liable. The latter, 
in most instances, do not.
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